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ZONING OUT: STATE ENTERPRISE ZONES’ 
IMPACT ON SPRAWL, JOB CREATION,  
AND ENVIRONMENT 
Sarah Kogel-Smucker* 
Abstract: State enterprise zone programs are a common type of eco-
nomic development incentive. These programs designate certain geo-
graphical areas as enterprise zones and provide tax breaks to qualified 
businesses located within those zones. Depending on the location of the 
geographical area chosen, enterprise zone programs may contribute to 
sprawl development. This Note first provides an overview of state enter-
prise zone programs. Second, this Note examines the programs’ envi-
ronmental impact by exploring their link to sprawl development. This 
Note ultimately argues that states should bring enterprise zone programs 
in line with smart growth principles. This Note also argues that advocates 
for such reform will be more successful if they are mindful of communi-
ties’ need for job creation and economic development. Consequently, this 
Note provides an overview of the economic literature evaluating state en-
terprise zone programs, and an overview of the evolving dynamic between 
job proponents and environmental advocates. 
Introduction 
 In today’s global marketplace, states struggle to ensure that their 
local economies prosper.1 To encourage economic development, 
most states invest significant revenue in a variety of tax incentives.2 
One common type of economic development incentive is state enter-
prise zone programs, which are employed by over forty states in the 
                                                                                                                      
* Managing Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2007–08. 
The author would like to thank John Stouffer, whose work at the Sierra Club Atlantic 
Chapter provided the idea for this Note, and her family for their support. 
1 See Terry F. Buss, The Effect of State Tax Incentives on Economic Growth and Firm Location 
Decisions, 2001 Econ. Dev. Q. 90, 90; Elizabeth McNichol & Makeda Harris, Ctr. on 
Budget & Policy Priorities, Many States Cut Budgets as Fiscal Squeeze Continues 
5 (2004), http://www.cbpp.org/4-22-04sfp.pdf. 
2 Robert G. Lynch, Rethinking Growth Strategies 1 (2004); Robert T. Greenbaum, 
Siting It Right: Do States Target Economic Distress When Designating Enterprise Zones?, 2001 Econ. 
Dev. Q. 67, 67. 
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United States.3 These programs designate certain geographical areas 
as enterprise zones and provide tax breaks to qualified businesses lo-
cated within those areas.4 While the goals of the state programs vary, 
most programs aim to stimulate business and investment in economi-
cally depressed areas, create jobs, generate economic growth, and ad-
dress the impacts of economic dislocations.5 
 Environmental advocates, however, have linked state enterprise 
zone programs to sprawl development.6 This link concerns environ-
mentalists because they contend that sprawl development causes the 
destruction of natural areas, and increases air and water pollution.7 
For environmental advocates, then, states should avoid these envi-
ronmental harms by promoting smart growth instead of sprawl devel-
opment.8 Attempts by advocates to address the environmental impact 
of enterprise zone programs, however, could be interpreted by zone 
communities as demanding a choice between jobs and environmental 
conservation, since enterprise zones are, in part, job creation pro-
grams.9 
 Since state enterprise zone programs are job creation programs 
that have been linked to sprawl, a critical evaluation of these pro-
grams requires both an evaluation of the programs’ environmental 
impact and of their success at job creation.10 Many communities view 
these two needs—job creation and environmental protection—as con-
flicting.11 Consequently, successful reform of any of the programs’ 
shortcomings requires an understanding of the evolving dynamic be-
                                                                                                                      
3 Alyssa Talanker, Kate Davis & Greg LeRoy, Good Jobs First, Straying from 
Good Intentions: How States Are Weakening Enterprise Zone and Tax Increment 
Financing Programs 5 (2003), available at http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/pdf/straying. 
pdf; Greenbaum, supra note 2, at 67. 
4 Greenbaum, supra note 2, at 67; see John Engberg & Robert Greenbaum, State Enter-
prise Zones and Local Housing Markets, 10 J. of Housing Research 163, 164, 165 (1999). 
5 See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 7071 (West 2007); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-30-102 (2006); 
Ala. Code § 11-40-16 (1989). 
6 See Greg LeRoy, Subsidizing Sprawl: How Economic Development Programs Are Going Awry, 
Multinational Monitor, Oct. 2003, at 9, 12 [hereinafter Subsidizing Sprawl]; James M. 
McElfish, Jr., Taxation Effects on Land Development and Conservation, 22 Temp. Envtl. L. & 
Tech. J. 139, 144 (2004). 
7 Subsidizing Sprawl, supra note 6, at 9; Natural Resources Defense Council, Paving 
Paradise: Sprawl and the Environment (1999), http://www.nrdc.org/cities/smartGrowth/ 
rpave.asp [hereinafter Paving Paradise]. 
8 Paving Paradise, supra note 7. 
9 See Engberg & Greenbaum, supra note 4, at 165; Paving Paradise, supra note 7. 
10 See Engberg & Greenbaum, supra note 4, at 165; Subsidizing Sprawl, supra note 6, at 9, 
12. 
11 Brian K. Obach, Labor and the Environmental Movement 6–7 (2004). 
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tween job proponents and environmental advocates.12 In addition, 
reform of the programs to address their links to sprawl may pit pro-
ponents of unfettered economic growth against advocates of more 
targeted planning.13 
 Part I of this Note provides an overview of state enterprise zone 
programs in regards to the programs’ history, goals, structures, and 
benefits. Part II documents the environmental impact of the pro-
grams, stemming from the programs’ contribution to sprawl devel-
opment. Since addressing the environmental impact raises a potential 
conflict between jobs and environmental protection, Part III reviews 
the dynamic of the potential conflict between advocates of jobs and 
environmental advocates. Part IV surveys the economic literature’s 
evaluation of state enterprise zone programs. Part V argues that states 
should explicitly consider the environmental impact of state enter-
prise zones. Part V further argues that state legislatures should revise 
their enterprise zone programs to address the programs’ links to 
sprawl development and to bring the programs in line with smart 
growth. Lastly, Part V argues that environmental advocates attempting 
to revise state enterprise zone programs should evaluate the programs 
against their stated economic goals, since, as evaluated in the bulk of 
economic literature, many of these programs fail to meet these goals. 
I. Overview of State Enterprise Zone Programs 
 States forgo significant revenue to provide economic develop-
ment incentives in order to attract business development and create 
jobs.14 One study estimated that in 1996, states and localities nation-
wide forwent $48.8 billion dollars in revenue through tax credits and 
subsidies to businesses.15 State enterprise zone programs are one 
                                                                                                                      
12 See id.; Ryan Ellis, Big Labor Partnering with Green Groups to Increase Political Power, Hu-
man Events Online, Nov. 1, 2006, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=17744. 
13 See Peter Gordon & Harry W. Richardson, Prove It: The Costs and Benefits of Sprawl, 
Brookings Rev., Fall 1998, at 23, 23; Charles W. Schmidt, Sprawl: The New Manifest Destiny? 
112 Envtl. Health Persp. A620, A627 (2004). 
14 Lynch, supra note 2, at 1. For example, a Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau report 
found that the state awarded $41,176,300 from 2001 to 2004 in enterprise development 
zone tax credits to businesses. State of Wis. Legislative Audit Bureau, State Econ. 
Dev. Programs 92 (2006). The Iowa Legislative Services Agency reported that enterprise 
zone program tax credits were $45.8 million in fiscal year 2005. Victor Elias & Charles 
Bruner, Iowa Fiscal Partnership, Looking Behind the Curtain: Unveiling the 
Problem of Tax Expenditures in Iowa 4 (2006), available at http://www.iowafiscal.org/ 
2006docs/061219-ifp-transp-full.pdf. 
15 Lynch, supra note 2, at 1. 
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common type of incentive that designate certain geographical areas as 
enterprise zones and provide tax breaks to qualified businesses lo-
cated within those areas.16 Typical incentives include “property tax 
abatements, state corporate income tax credits for job creation and 
investment, sales and use tax exemptions, lower utility rates, and tax-
free low-interest loans.”17 As of 2004, more than forty states had some 
form of enterprise zone program.18 
A. History and Goals of State Enterprise Zone Programs 
 Localities in the United States have used tax incentives to attract 
businesses since the colonial period.19 In fact, Alexander Hamilton 
received a tax incentive to site a factory in New Jersey in 1791.20 The 
concept of enterprise zone programs, however, was developed by Brit-
ish academics in the late 1970s and championed by conservative 
members of Parliament who believed that lessening the tax burden in 
struggling cities would spur local investment and business growth.21 
The idea was popularized in the United States by Stuart Butler, a pol-
icy analyst at the conservative think tank, the Heritage Foundation.22 
Though national legislation initially failed, states began enacting en-
terprise zone programs in the early 1980s.23 
                                                                                                                      
16 Greenbaum, supra note 2, at 67; see Engberg & Greenbaum, supra note 4, at 165. 
17 Talanker, Davis & LeRoy, supra note 3, at 5. 
18 Greenbaum, supra note 2, at 67. 
19 Buss, supra note 1, at 91. 
20 Id. 
21 Alan H. Peters & Peter S. Fisher, State Enterprise Zone Programs: Have 
They Worked? 24 (2002). The constitutionality of state tax incentives under the Com-
merce Clause was challenged by local taxpayers in a recent case, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. 
Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1859 (2006). The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims by holding 
that they lacked standing to challenge the state tax incentives in federal court. Id. at 1864. 
It is beyond the scope of this Note to address Commerce Clause challenges to these pro-
grams. While a Supreme Court ruling that state tax incentives violate the Commerce 
Clause could alter drastically the analysis provided in this Note, the impact of state enter-
prise zone programs is significant enough to warrant analysis under the current state of 
the law. See generally Sherry L. Jarrell et al., Law and Economics of Regulating Local Economic 
Development Incentives, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 805 (2006), for an overview of this issue. 
22 Peters & Fisher, supra note 21, at 24–25. 
23 Id. at 25, 26. In 1993, Congress provided for the designation of federal Empower-
ment Zones and Enterprise Communities. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 
Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 543. This Note does not address the federal enterprise zone 
program because the program significantly differs from many state programs, especially in 
its emphasis on strategic planning. See Karen Mossberger, State-Federal Diffusion and Policy 
Learning: From Enterprise Zones to Empowerment Zones, 29 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM, Summer 
1999, at 31, 39–40. 
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 State enterprise zone programs vary in goals, structure, and 
benefits.24 Stated goals often include stimulating business and invest-
ment in economically depressed areas, creating jobs, generating eco-
nomic growth, and addressing the impact of economic dislocations.25 
For example, the Alabama enterprise zone statute states: 
[T]here are certain economically depressed areas in such cit-
ies that need particular attention to create new jobs, stimulate 
economic activity and attract private sector investment rather 
than government subsidy to improve the quality of life of their 
citizens. It is the purpose of this section to encourage new 
economic activity in these depressed areas . . . .26 
Similarly, the California enterprise zone statute’s stated purpose is “to 
stimulate business and industrial growth in the depressed areas of the 
state by relaxing regulatory controls that impede private investment.”27 
 Justifications for using enterprise zone programs to achieve such 
goals vary.28 Some proponents argue that areas that businesses regard 
as high-risk need additional incentives to secure investment.29 Accord-
ing to these proponents, it is worthwhile to attract such investment be-
cause poverty tends to concentrate in certain geographical areas; there-
fore, one must stimulate economic growth in economically depressed 
areas to address poverty.30 Enterprise zone programs are thus devel-
oped from a belief that anti-poverty policies must address community 
development rather than solely focusing on individual achievement.31 
For instance, the Illinois enterprise zone statute’s stated purposes in-
clude “stimulating neighborhood revitalization of depressed areas of 
the State . . . .”32 Enterprise zones located in urban areas also address 
the perceived inequity often referred to as the “spatial mismatch hy-
                                                                                                                      
24 Peters & Fisher, supra note 21, at 27. 
25 See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 7071 (West 2007); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-30-102 (2006); 
Ala. Code § 11-40-16 (1989). 
26 Ala. Code § 11-40-16. 
27 Cal. Gov’t Code § 7071; see also La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1782 (2003) (declaring 
the purpose of the state’s enterprise zone program as “to stimulate business and industrial 
growth in these areas of the state by the relaxation of governmental controls, by providing 
assistance to businesses and industries, and by providing tax incentives in these areas”). 
28 Buss, supra note 1, at 91. 
29 Margaret G. Wilder & Barry M. Rubin, Rhetoric Versus Reality: A Review of Studies on 
State Enterprise Zone Programs, 62 J. Am. Plan. Ass’n 473, 474 (1996). 
30 Greenbaum, supra note 2, at 68–69. 
31 Engberg & Greenbaum, supra note 4, at 165. 
32 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 655/2 (1993). 
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pothesis.”33 This hypothesis states that inner-city residents are often 
barred from accessing flourishing suburban job markets by inadequate 
transportation and cultural barriers.34 
 Other proponents focus on the state economy, arguing that enter-
prise zone incentives are needed to keep businesses from moving to 
other states, aid struggling firms, and attract out-of-state businesses.35 
The California enterprise zone statute, for instance, states that the en-
terprise zone program will serve to “help attract business and industry 
to the state, to help retain and expand existing state business and in-
dustry, and to create increased job opportunities for all Californians.”36 
B. Structure and Benefits of State Enterprise Zone Programs 
 The structures of enterprise zone programs vary by state, and 
some state programs adopt different names such as Pennsylvania’s Key-
stone Opportunity Zones.37 Despite these variations, most programs 
share common characteristics.38 Each state program has a “central 
zone-coordinating agency” that administers the program statewide and 
a local body that governs individual zones.39 Each state program also 
delineates criteria for an area to be designated as an enterprise zone.40 
Many states limit the total number of enterprise zones that can be cre-
ated in a year and the total number of enterprise zones statewide.41 As a 
result of such limitations, every qualifying area is not guaranteed zone 
                                                                                                                      
33 Peters & Fisher, supra note 21, at 41. 
34 Id. at 41–42. 
35 Buss, supra note 1, at 91. 
36 Cal. Gov’t Code § 7071 (West 2007); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 12-10-20 (2000) 
(stating that an intent of the state’s enterprise zone act was “to induce the location or ex-
pansion of manufacturing, processing, services, distribution, warehousing, research and 
development, corporate offices, and certain tourism facilities within the State”). 
37 Peters & Fisher, supra note 21, at 21; Engberg & Greenbaum, supra note 4, at 165; 
Pennsylvania Department of Community & Economic Development, Keystone Opportunity 
Zones (KOZ), http://www.newpa.com/default.aspx?id=345 (last visited Jan. 16, 2008). Pro-
gram titles include “Renaissance Zones,” “Keystone Opportunity Zones,” “Development 
Zones,” and “Program Areas.” Peters & Fisher, supra. 
38 Engberg & Greenbaum, supra note 4, at 165. 
39 Id. The programs are usually administered under the state departments of economic 
development or departments of commerce. See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 7072(a), 
7073(b)(1) (West 2007) (stating that the Department of Housing and Community Devel-
opment shall designate enterprise zones); N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law §§ 957(b), 959 (McKinney 
2004) (stating that New York’s empire zone program is administered by the Commissioner 
of Economic Development). 
40 Engberg & Greenbaum, supra note 4, at 165. 
41 Talanker, Davis & LeRoy, supra note 3, at 5. 
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status.42 Some states require the passage of a local ordinance, public 
notice, and a public hearing before a locality can apply for zone desig-
nation.43 States’ criteria for zone designation may include unemploy-
ment level, a maximum threshold for zone resident income levels, 
population loss, and a certain percentage of vacant buildings.44 States 
sometimes set stricter criteria for zone designation initially and then 
amend the program so that more areas qualify for enterprise zones.45 
At least eleven states have expanded their original zone eligibility crite-
ria by extending enterprise zone benefits throughout the state, adding 
“non-contiguous land” to a zone, extending eligibility benefits to busi-
nesses not located within a zone, or enlarging the size of their zones.46 
 All states also require businesses to meet certain criteria in order 
to qualify for zone benefits, but criteria vary by state.47 The vast major-
ity of programs require a business to be located in the zone.48 Many 
programs require either a “minimal capital investment” or that busi-
nesses create a certain number of jobs within the zone.49 Some states 
tie incentive levels to the number of jobs created or the level of capital 
investment.50 Other states require businesses to hire employees who 
live within the zone and some require businesses to pay at least a 
minimum specified wage.51 
 States also differ with respect to the benefits they provide.52 Typi-
cal zone benefits include an investment tax credit and a job tax 
credit.53 Other benefits include: assistance for job training; increased 
funding for infrastructure and public services; sales tax exemption; 
local property tax abatement applied to real property improvements; 
and full or partial exemption from income tax on profits attributable 
to zone investment.54 Some states provide certain benefits statewide, 
with additional benefits for businesses located within the zones, while 
other states limit benefits to businesses located within the zones.55 A 
                                                                                                                      
42 See id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id.; Engberg & Greenbaum, supra note 4, at 165. 
45 See Talanker, Davis & LeRoy, supra note 3, at 38–39. 
46 See id. 
47 Engberg & Greenbaum, supra note 4, at 165. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Talanker, Davis & LeRoy, supra note 3, at 5. 
52 Engberg & Greenbaum, supra note 4, at 165. 
53 Peters & Fisher, supra note 21, at 32. 
54 Id.; Engberg & Greenbaum, supra note 4, at 166. 
55 See Peters & Fisher, supra note 21, at 32. 
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1992 survey of 112 cities, forty-four of which contained enterprise 
zones, found that the total incentive package for businesses in cities 
that had enterprise zones was on average two to three times higher 
than the average incentive package for businesses in cities without 
enterprise zones.56 
C. Example: New York State’s Empire Zone Program 
 New York State’s empire zone program provides an example of 
how one state has structured its enterprise zone program.57 New York 
State’s empire zone program designates targeted areas across the state 
as “empire zones.”58 As of November 2007, there were eighty-two em-
pire zones statewide.59 To be considered for zone designation by the 
state, a municipality must adopt a local law authorizing a municipal 
corporation to submit an application for zone designation.60 To be eli-
gible for zone designation, an area must be characterized by “pervasive 
poverty, high unemployment and general economic distress.”61 The 
application must demonstrate local support, economic planning, and 
existing infrastructure within the zone.62 Once a zone is designated, all 
businesses located within the zone may apply for a real property tax 
exemption, a tax credit for qualified investments in the empire zone 
capital corporation and community development projects, and a re-
fund or credit of state and local sales taxes for purchases of goods or 
services within the zone.63 
                                                                                                                      
56 Id. at 33. 
57 Though the program was established in 1986, from 1986 until 1999 empire zones 
were called economic development zones. Office of Budget & Policy Analysis, Office 
of the State Comptroller, New York State: The Agenda for Reform 91, 93 (2006). 
New York is one of many state enterprise zone programs that has a name other than en-
terprise zones. See Peters & Fisher, supra note 21, at 21. 
58 N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 957(d) (McKinney 2004). 
59 Empire Zones, Tax and Finacial Incentives, Empire State Development, http://www. 
empire.state.ny.us/Tax_and_Financial_Incentives/Empire_Zones/default.asp (last visited 
Jan. 16, 2008). 
60 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 5, § 10.3(a) (2007). 
61 Id. § 10.4(a). A zone is designated by the Empire Zone Designation Board, which is 
comprised of the Commissioner of Taxation and Finance, the Director of the Budget, the 
Commissioner of Labor, two members appointed by the governor, one member appointed 
by the president of the state senate, and one appointed by the speaker of the state assem-
bly. N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 960(a). 
62 N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 961. In 2005 the New York State Legislature amended its em-
pire zone program to require that any application for zone designation demonstrate that 
there is no viable alterative area that has existing public water or sewer infrastructure. Id. 
63 N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 485-e (McKinney 2006); N.Y. Tax Law §§ 210(20), 
606(i), 606(l), 1456(d), 1511(h), 1119(a), 1210 (McKinney 2006); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & 
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 Businesses within the zone that become jointly certified by the lo-
cal zone administrators and the state are eligible to receive additional 
incentives, including an investment tax credit against corporate fran-
chise tax and personal income tax, a wage tax credit, and a real prop-
erty tax credit.64 The result of these incentives is that certified busi-
nesses that create jobs can operate on an almost “tax-free” basis for up 
to ten years.65 To become certified, a business located within an empire 
zone must submit a completed application that must be approved by 
the local zone administration board, local zone certification officer, the 
Commissioner of Economic Development, and the Commissioner of 
Labor.66 As of November 2007, the State’s zones contained over 9800 
certified businesses that reported employing over 380,000 people.67 
II. Environmental Impact of State Enterprise Zone Programs 
 The environmental impact of state enterprise zone programs 
largely depends on where the zones are designated.68 Under the origi-
nal vision of state enterprise zone programs, the programs could func-
tion as part of smart growth efforts at urban revitalization because they 
encouraged businesses to redevelop blighted urban areas.69 In many 
                                                                                                                      
Regs. tit. 5, § 11.1(c)(1)–(3). An empire zone capital corporation is a corporation that 
may be established through approval by the zone board and the Commissioner of the De-
partment of Economic Development to raise funds to make both loans to certified busi-
nesses and investments in those businesses. N.Y. Gen Mun. Law § 964 (Consol. 2006). 
64 N.Y. Tax Law §§ 14, 15, 210, 606, 1456(e), 1456(o), 1511(r), 1511(s) (McKinney 
2006); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 5, § 11.1. 
65 See Description of Benefits, Tax and Financial Incentives, Empire State Develop-
ment, http://www.empire.state.ny.us/Tax_and_Financial_Incentives/Empire_Zones/de- 
scriptions_benefits.asp (last visited Jan. 16, 2008). For example, a consulting firm, Program 
Evaluation and Management Research, Inc., estimated that between 1993 and 1995 the 
program’s net benefit to New York State was negative $30.5 million. Office of Budget & 
Policy Analysis, supra note 57, at 98, 99. 
66 See N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law §§ 957(b), 963(a) (Consol. 2006). 
67 Empire Zones, Tax and Finacial Incentives, Empire State Development, http://www. 
empire.state.ny.us/Tax_and_Financial_Incentives/Empire_Zones/default.asp (last visited 
Jan. 16, 2008). 
68 See Greg LeRoy, The Great American Jobs Scam 129, 131 (2005). 
69 See F. Kaid Benfield et al., Once There Were Greenfields 138 (1999); Peters & 
Fisher, supra note 21, at 24; LeRoy, supra note 68, at 129. Smart growth does not have one 
definition. Ed Bolen et al., Smart Growth: A Review of Programs State by State, 8 Hastings W.-
Nw. J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 145, 145 (2002). One article characterized smart growth by stat-
ing that “Smart Growth strives to protect farmland and open space, revitalize neighbor-
hoods, and provide more transportation choices. Smart Growth encourages reinvestment 
in existing communities, more efficient use of existing infrastructure . . . .” Alyson L. 
Geller, Smart Growth: A Prescription for Livable Cities, 93 Am. J. Pub. Health 1410, 1411 
(2003). 
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states, however, enterprise zones have not been limited to blighted ur-
ban communities.70 Rather, zones have been designated outside urban 
centers in a manner that environmental advocates contend contribute 
to sprawl.71 
A. Enterprise Zones’ Impact on Development Patterns:  
Sprawl and Smart Growth 
 Sprawl has a range of definitions.72 Richard Moe, President of the 
National Trust for Historic Preservation, has defined sprawl as “low-
density development on the edges of cities and towns that is poorly 
planned, land-consumptive, automobile-dependent [and] designed 
without regard to its surroundings.”73 Similarly, the organization Smart 
Growth America has defined sprawl as “the outcome of four factors: low 
residential density; a poor mix of homes, jobs, and services; limited ac-
tivity centers and downtown areas; and limited options for walking and 
biking.”74 Development advocates contend, however, that many Ameri-
cans favor so-called sprawl development.75 
 Enterprise zone programs can increase sprawl development if 
structured in ways that incentivize that sort of development.76 Envi-
ronmentalists contend that one way enterprise zone programs contrib-
ute to sprawl development is by failing to ensure that zone locations are 
accessible by public transportation.77 A 2003 report, Missing the Bus, 
                                                                                                                      
70 See LeRoy, supra note 68, at 129; Peters & Fisher, supra note 21, at 24. 
71 See LeRoy, supra note 68, at 129; Peters & Fisher, supra note 21, at 24. 
72 See, e.g., Robert H. Freilich & Bruce G. Peshoff, The Social Costs of Sprawl, 29 Urb. 
Law. 183, 185 (1997); Schmidt, supra note 13, at A623. 
73 Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 72, at 185. Similarly, the Sierra Club, an environmental 
organization, has defined sprawl as “irresponsible, poorly planned development that destroys 
green space, increases traffic, crowds schools and drives up taxes.” Sierra Club, Sprawl 
Costs Us All 2 (2000), available at http://www.sierraclub.org/sprawl/report00/sprawl.pdf. 
74 Schmidt, supra note 13, at A623. 
75 See The Quality Growth Coalition, Building Better Communities: A Toolkit 
for Quality Growth 12 (2000), available at http://www.qualitygrowth.org/toolkit.pdf 
(contending that the vast majority of U.S. residents prefer to live in such development, and 
citing a National Association of Home Builders study found that 83% of Americans prefer 
to live in the suburbs in detached single-family homes); Gordon & Richardson, supra note 
13, at 23 (contending that “it is hard to avoid concluding that ‘sprawl’ is most people’s 
preferred life-style”). 
76 See LeRoy, supra note 6, at 9, 12. 
77 See Mafruza Khan & Greg LeRoy, Missing the Bus: How States Fail to Con-
nect Economic Development with Public Transit 1 (2003). 
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concluded that no state “effectively coordinat[ed] its economic devel-
opment spending with public transportation planning.”78 
 Another way enterprise zone programs can be viewed as contribut-
ing to sprawl development is by encouraging business relocation within 
a state.79 This encouragement can contribute to sprawl development if 
a business relocates from an older, established community into a newly 
expanding community.80 A study of companies that relocated into en-
terprise zones in Ohio found that of the seventy-six business relocations 
in 1998, sixty-eight corporate relocations impacting 6523 jobs were in-
trastate moves, and only six relocations impacting 323 jobs were inter-
state relocations.81 Thus, by a ratio of twenty to one, more jobs were 
moved within the state than from other states.82 A 2003 study of popu-
lation and land use trends in upstate New York found that although the 
population of upstate New York only grew by 2.6% between 1982 and 
1997, urban acreage increased by 30%.83 This increase resulted from 
the conversion of “over 425,000 acres of land from rural uses (mostly 
agricultural and forest land) to urban development.”84 The report cited 
New York State’s empire zone program as one of the causes of this 
“sprawl without growth,” as it “often encourag[ed] jobs to simply move 
from one Upstate location to another.”85 Similarly, an article in the 
Kansas City Star examined the links between tax incentive programs— 
including the State’s enterprise zone program—and business reloca-
tion from Kansas City to surrounding suburbs and towns.86 Prominent 
companies such as Toys “R” Us, Inc., and Sealright Co., Inc., had taken 
tax incentives to move from Kansas City to surrounding suburbs and 
                                                                                                                      
78 Id. This report was produced by Good Jobs First, a policy resource center. See id.; 
Good Jobs First, About Us, http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/about_us.cfm (last visited Jan. 
16, 2008). 
79 See Greg LeRoy, Economic Development Subsidies: Another Cause of Sprawl, http://www. 
smartgrowthamerica.org/econ_dev.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Economic 
Development Subsidies]. 
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towns.87 Speaking on this loss of business, Philip Kirk Jr., president of a 
downtown Kansas City development force, commented: “Some of the 
tools we’ve designed to reverse the trends of sprawl are being applied 
anywhere and everywhere.”88 
 By contrast, Maryland explicitly links its economic development 
subsidies to smart growth planning.89 Maryland’s Smart Growth and 
Neighborhood Conservation Initiative won the Harvard University 
John F. Kennedy School of Government and Ford Foundation Award 
for Innovation in American Government.90 Maryland directs state 
spending into established communities.91 The program seeks to pre-
serve natural resources, ensure that state expenditures support exist-
ing communities and neighborhoods, and save funds by avoiding the 
cost of building the new public infrastructure that sprawl requires.92 
The program creates Priority Funding Areas (PFAs) as areas “targeted 
for future growth” and prohibits state spending on “growth-related 
projects” outside PFAs.93 State spending also must be consistent with 
local development plans.94 All previously designated state enterprise 
zone programs were included in a PFA.95 
B. Environmental Impact of Sprawl Development 
 Environmental advocates contend that the environmental impact 
of sprawl development includes the destruction of natural areas and 
increased pollution.96 Sprawl development’s contribution to the de-
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struction of open space is well-documented.97 It is estimated that one 
million acres of farmland are developed in the United States annu-
ally.98 The Department of Agriculture reported that sixteen million 
acres of forest, cropland, and open space were developed between 
1992 and 1997.99 Development often exceeds population growth.100 A 
Brookings Institution study found that urbanized land area increased 
by 47% between 1982 and 1997, but the United States population 
only increased by 17% during the same period.101 
 In addition, sprawl development leads to increased use of auto-
mobiles as people travel farther for work, errands, and recreation.102 
Congestion caused by sprawl cost $72 billion per year nationally in 
lost time and expended fuel.103 Increased automobile usage increases 
air pollution, degrades air quality, and contributes to global warm-
ing.104 In 1994, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
stated that “[u]nhealthy air pollution levels still plague virtually every 
major city in the United States,” concluding that “[t]his is largely be-
cause development and urban sprawl have created new pollution 
sources and have contributed to a doubling of vehicle travel since 
1970.”105 In terms of global warming, approximately 32%, or 450 mil-
lion metric tons, of the United States’ total of carbon dioxide emis-
sions into the atmosphere each year come from transportation.106 
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 Environmental advocates further contend that sprawl develop-
ment threatens water quality due to increased stormwater runoff.107 
Sprawl development increases the amount of impervious surface— 
such as rooftops and paved parking lots—in a watershed.108 When it 
rains on an impervious surface, water does not get absorbed into the 
ground, but instead accumulates on that surface and then runs into 
nearby waterbodies carrying pollutants.109 For example, a one-inch 
rain storm would result in 3450 cubic feet of runoff from a one-acre 
paved parking lot, but only 218 cubic feet from a one-acre meadow.110 
Impervious surface thus increases the volume and speed of stormwa-
ter runoff, which in turn increases flooding, erosion, and pollutant 
discharges into waterbodies.111 Runoff pollution is estimated to affect 
40% of surveyed rivers, lakes, and estuaries in the United States.112 
 Sprawl development threatens wildlife through habitat loss, habitat 
fragmentation, and increased pollution in wildlife habitats.113 For ex-
ample, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) reported that 
sprawl development has eliminated over 90% of the coastal sage ecosys-
tem in Southern California, which the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
called “one of the most depleted habitats in the United States.”114 In 
Florida, an estimated thirty to fifty adult Florida panthers remain in a 
limited habitat that continues to be converted for residential and agri-
cultural uses.115 
 In response to these environmental problems, development advo-
cates contend that the impact of the development of farmland and 
natural areas has been exaggerated.116 They argue that increased pro-
ductivity compensates for a loss of farmland.117 Moreover, significant 
farmland still exists—farmland comprises approximately half of the 1.9 
billion acres in the contiguous forty-eight states; by comparison, 
wooded land comprises 33% of those acres, while developed land is 
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only 3%.118 Likewise, development advocates challenge the link be-
tween increased vehicle usage due to sprawl development and in-
creased vehicle emissions.119 They contend that overall highway vehicle 
emissions have declined, even with increased vehicle usage, because of 
ongoing technological improvements.120 They argue that programs en-
couraging people to reduce their vehicle usage have failed to improve 
air quality and that traffic congestion is not caused by sprawl, but rather 
by inadequate road construction.121 More generally, development ad-
vocates counter concerns about the environmental impact of sprawl 
development by emphasizing that development decisions should be the 
free choice of property owners and that attempts to limit development 
tread upon this freedom.122 
III. Jobs Versus the Environment: An Evolving Dynamic 
 Zone communities could interpret attempts by environmental ad-
vocates to address the environmental impact of enterprise zone pro-
grams as demanding a choice between jobs and environmental conser-
vation since enterprise zones are, in part, job creation programs.123 
This conflicting dynamic is one that environmental organizations have 
tried to avoid in recent years.124 
 Environmental protection was not always viewed as threatening job 
creation.125 In fact, labor unions were generally strong supporters of 
the modern environmental movement at its beginning.126 Initially, un-
ions were mostly concerned about the environment as it affected public 
health.127 Unions, however, also allied with the conservation move-
ment.128 In 1958, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) supported the National Wilderness 
Preservation System’s creation.129 The AFL-CIO was the largest individ-
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ual contributor to the first Earth Day in 1970, and labor unions sup-
ported the Clean Air Act of 1970 and the Clean Water Act of 1972.130 
 In the 1980s, however, several high-profile conflicts cemented 
public perception that communities had to choose between jobs and 
environmental protection.131 Specifically, in the Pacific Northwest, 
local communities rallied around the timber industry when it alleged 
that environmental regulations designed to protect old-growth forests 
and the habitat of the spotted owl would cost communities thousands 
of timber industry jobs.132 Similarly, the United Mine Workers clashed 
with environmental advocates over the acid rain provisions in the 
Clean Air Act’s 1990 amendments.133 
 In 1999, the high-profile coalition of the International Brother-
hood of Teamsters and environmentalists in opposition to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) illustrated a shift towards more concerted 
cooperative attempts between labor unions and environmental organi-
zations.134 Commentators challenged the notion that communities must 
chose between jobs and the environment.135 The United Steelworkers of 
America’s 1990 report, Our Children’s Future, stated: 
Steelworkers have heard the jobs argument before. For many 
years companies have tried to use economic and environ-
mental blackmail on the union and its members. In every 
fight for a new health and safety regulation . . . there is a cor-
porate economist to tell us that if we persist, the company or 
industry will fold, with hundreds or thousands of lost jobs. It 
rarely turns out to be true.136 
Some of these alliances have been formalized.137 The United Steel-
workers Union and the Sierra Club announced a “strategic alliance” 
in June 2006 to create a “Blue-Green Alliance” focusing on three ma-
jor issues: global warming and clean energy, fair trade, and reducing 
toxins.138 Another formal alliance is the Apollo Alliance, a coalition of 
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labor unions and environmental organizations.139 The Alliance’s mis-
sion is “to build a broad-based constituency in support of a sustainable 
and clean energy economy that will create millions of good jobs for 
the nation, reduce our dependence on foreign oil, and create cleaner 
and healthier communities.”140 
 Challenging the notion that communities must choose between 
jobs and environmental conservation, some economists have argued 
that the impact of environmental regulations on jobs is unproven or 
exaggerated and that environmental regulations can have a positive 
effect on jobs.141 For example, a Boston University study of Los Angeles 
area refineries found that air pollution regulations increased employ-
ment, likely because companies hired workers to install and maintain 
abatement equipment.142 In The Trade-Off Myth, the author’s review of 
the economic effects of environmental regulations found that envi-
ronmental regulations caused less than one-tenth of one percent of 
yearly layoffs in the United States, approximately 3000 jobs.143 
IV. Economic Evaluation of State Enterprise Zone Programs 
 In addition to examining environmental impact, state enterprise 
zone programs can be evaluated on their own terms, by examining if 
the programs meet their stated goals of economic development, firm 
attraction and retention, and job creation. 
A. Economic Evaluation of State Enterprise Zone Programs 
 Most states do not evaluate the efficacy of their tax incentive pro-
grams, including enterprise zone programs.144 The National Associa-
tion of State Development Agencies (NASDA) found that states did not 
conduct comprehensive evaluations of the cost and benefit of the fi-
nancial incentives they provided to businesses.145 The Council of State 
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Governments’ 1997 annual incentive study reported that a limited 
number of states used a formal cost-benefit model to determine the 
economic impact of tax and financial incentives.146 Likewise, the Na-
tional Conference of State Legislators (NCSL) found that “few states 
know the exact amount they spend on economic development initia-
tives.”147 While states rarely conduct comprehensive reviews of their en-
terprise zone programs, a growing body of economic literature has 
evaluated state enterprise zone programs in terms of their influence on 
firm locating decisions, economic growth, and job creation.148 
1. State Enterprise Zone Programs’ Effect on Firm Location 
Decisions 
 The general consensus among economists until 1980 was that 
taxes had a minimal effect on business location decisions, but current 
surveys vary in results.149 One review of the literature reported that 
since 1980 most economic studies “have found a negative relationship 
between taxes and growth,” indicating that firms consider tax policy 
and benefits when making siting decisions.150 By contrast, another re-
view of the literature concluded that there was “scant evidence” in such 
studies that tax cuts and incentive packages induce firms to relocate to 
communities with low income levels and high unemployment.151 
 Some economists argue that when tax incentives fail to influence 
business location decisions, it may be because the taxes are too small a 
percentage of profits to have a significant impact.152 Peters and Fisher, 
urban and regional planning professors specializing in state and local 
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economic development policy, conducted a 1997 study of 112 cities 
from twenty-four states and found that general tax incentives on aver-
age totaled 0.7% of the studied industries’ pre-tax profit while enter-
prise zone tax incentives were, on average, 1.5% of pre-tax profits.153 
This minimal difference in profit rate would therefore be eclipsed by 
minor differences in the cost of doing business.154 Accordingly, Peters 
and Fisher’s 2002 study found that a wage premium can eliminate the 
financial advantages of enterprise zone tax incentives.155 That study 
found that for sixteen industries in seventy-five cities across thirteen 
states, a wagepremium of eighty-three cents per hour would offset the 
total value of all tax incentives at the state and local level.156 
2. State Enterprise Zone Impact on Economic Growth 
 Most recent studies of state enterprise zone programs have found 
that the zones have little or no impact on economic growth.157 A 1996 
study of New Jersey’s enterprise zone program “found no evidence 
that the New Jersey enterprise zone program resulted in increased 
economic activity.”158 A 1998 study that examined the impact of state 
enterprise zone programs on business and housing market outcomes 
in six states found that overall, zones have minimal impact on busi-
ness growth.159 While zones did create new business activity, the total 
number of businesses in the zone actually decreased.160 Similarly, a 
1999 study found that, on average, enterprise zones had little impact 
on housing markets, which the study asserted as an indicator of zone 
success.161 A 2000 study found that the total amount of financial bene-
fits the zones provided was not a meaningful factor for predicting 
growth.162 Likewise, the different types of benefits the zones provided 
were not meaningful factors.163 By contrast, a 2003 report on Califor-
nia’s state enterprise zone program concluded that the taxes collected 
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from jobs generated by state enterprise zones “returned to the state 
treasury enough new taxes to pay for the program costs.”164 
 In a review of these studies, Peters and Fisher concluded that 
while econometric studies of enterprise zones were “controversial,” 
and the results were “not in agreement,” the majority of recent litera-
ture concluded that state enterprise zones had “little or no impact on 
growth.”165 Peters and Fisher conducted their own analysis that com-
pared sixty-five zones in thirteen states by developing hypothetical 
representative firms and applying each zone’s benefits to the firms.166 
They concluded that enterprise zones have “no discernable positive 
effect on new economic activity.”167 In addition, a study of Louisville, 
Kentucky’s enterprise zone did not observe economic benefits or 
neighborhood revitalization that could be attributed to the enterprise 
zone program.168 
3. State Enterprise Zone Impact on Job Creation 
 Studies also vary regarding the impact of state enterprise zones on 
job creation.169 A 1994 study of Indiana’s enterprise zone program 
found roughly a 19% decrease in unemployment claims within an en-
terprise zone the year after zone designation, indicating that the zones 
had a significant impact on job creation.170 By contrast, a 2000 study 
evaluating the impact of enterprise zones in six states concluded that 
enterprise zones have little positive impact on “employment out-
comes.”171 Similarly, Peters and Fisher’s analysis of seventy-five zones in 
thirteen states concluded that “the average labor price reduction” due 
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to zone incentives was greater than 1% in only two states, and that the 
“maximum price reduction” due to zone incentives was never greater 
than 3%.172 In addition, Peters and Fisher concluded that for zones 
that “spatially targeted” blighted communities, the targeted communi-
ties might not benefit most from the jobs.173 Their study suggested that 
the zones did not create many additional jobs, and that jobs that were 
created were often held by employees living outside the zones.174 In 
fact, these employees who commuted from outside the zones appeared 
to live in wealthier neighborhoods.175 
V. Need for Reform 
A. Addressing the Environmental Impact of State Enterprise Zone Programs 
 While the stated goals of state enterprise zone programs may be 
solely economic and socioeconomic—to stimulate business and invest-
ment in economically depressed areas, create jobs, generate economic 
growth, and address the impact of economic dislocations—the impact 
of these programs is also environmental.176 By designating geographical 
areas for economic development, state enterprise zone programs make 
decisions about where to encourage development.177 However, the 
zone designation process generally does not include a consideration of 
the environmental consequences of these decisions.178 Zone designa-
tion criteria generally focus on indicators of poverty or economic need, 
such as high unemployment, a maximum threshold for zone resident 
income levels, and population loss; these criteria rarely include coordi-
nation with regional planning, statewide conservation goals, or an 
evaluation of the environmental impact of zone locations.179 Moreover, 
enterprise zone programs are usually administered under the state de-
partments of commerce or economic development and do not involve 
input from environmental conservation departments or those with the 
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expertise to critically examine these development choices.180 Although 
local authorities may consider their own communities’ physical devel-
opment goals when deciding where to locate a zone within their local-
ity, broader patterns of urban, suburban, and rural development are 
rarely examined on a regional or statewide level during the zone desig-
nation process.181 
 The physical development impact of state enterprise zones should 
be explicitly examined and considered, as these programs represent 
significant forgone revenue.182 For example, a Wisconsin Legislative 
Audit Bureau report found that the state awarded $41,176,300 in en-
terprise development zone tax credits to businesses from 2001 to 
2004.183 Before Wisconsin, or any other state, forgoes over forty-one 
million dollars, it should carefully consider the impact of such spend-
ing.184 In addition, if the programs’ impact on development patterns is 
not examined, this spending may inadvertently conflict with state 
spending on land conservation and planning.185 For example, voters in 
many states have approved spending to protect natural areas from 
sprawl development.186 From 1998 to 2002, voters approved more than 
$20 billion for the purchase of open space in state and local ballot ini-
tiatives.187 In the November 2004 election, voters approved 120 ballot 
measures that allotted $3.25 billion for land conservation measures.188 
It makes little sense for a state to spend taxpayer money to conserve 
natural areas while providing tax incentives that might encourage the 
destruction of those same areas. 
 State legislatures should revise their enterprise zone programs to 
address links to sprawl development and to bring the programs in line 
with smart growth strategies. Links to sprawl development are signifi-
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cant enough to warrant amending the programs.189 Several studies have 
documented these links.190 For example, a study of companies that re-
located into enterprise zones in Ohio found that, by a ratio of twenty to 
one, more jobs were moved within the state than from other states.191 
Of the seventy-four company relocations in 1998, sixty-eight reloca-
tions—affecting 6523 jobs—were moves within the state and six reloca-
tions—impacting 323 jobs—were moves from other states.192 A 2003 
study of population and land use trends in upstate New York cited New 
York State’s empire zone program as one of the causes of “sprawl with-
out growth,” as it often encouraged employers to move jobs within up-
state New York.193 The report found that although the population of 
upstate New York only grew by 2.6% between 1982 and 1997, urban 
acreage increased by 30%, since the region converted over 425,000 
acres of land from rural uses, such as agricultural and forest land, to 
urban ones.194 Further, the very nature of enterprise zone programs 
leads to the conclusion that they could be linked to sprawl because the 
intent of the programs is to direct business to locate in a designated 
geographical area.195 When a program’s links to sprawl have been 
documented, the program should be amended to address these 
links.196 The information gap that exists when a program’s links to 
sprawl development remain unknown highlights the need for states to 
conduct more comprehensive review of the environmental impact of 
their enterprise zone programs.197 
 States should amend their programs so as to limit the destructive 
environmental impact of sprawl development.198 First, when develop-
ment increases faster than the population, as it does in many areas of 
the country, new development unnecessarily converts natural areas and 
farmland into strip malls, houses, and office parks.199 A Brookings Insti-
tution study found that between 1982 and 1997 the United States popu-
lation increased by 17% while urbanized land increased by 47%.200 This 
                                                                                                                      
189 See LeRoy, supra note 68, at 129. 
190 See Pendall, supra note 80, at 1, 3, 9; Development Subsides and Labor Unions, supra 
note 81. 
191 Development Subsides and Labor Unions, supra note 81. 
192 Id. 
193 Pendall, supra note 80, at 3, 9. 
194 Id. at 1, 9. 
195 See Engberg & Greenbaum, supra note 4, at 164–65. 
196 See, e.g., Pendall, supra note 80, at 3, 7, 9. 
197 See Buss, supra note 1, at 93; Economic Development Subsidies, supra note 79. 
198 See Paving Paradise, supra note 7. 
199 See Benfield et al., supra note 69, at 12; Dowling, supra note 98, at 877–78. 
200 Subsidizing Sprawl, supra note 6, at 10. 
134 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 35:111 
unnecessary destruction of farmland and natural areas is a matter of 
concern.201 An increase in existing farmland’s productivity does not 
necessarily compensate for the destruction of farmland, as contended 
by development advocates.202 Farmland has unique sociological and 
aesthetic benefits.203 In addition, while development advocates may be 
correct in pointing out that significant farmland and rural areas still 
exist nationwide, these overall statistics mask the trend to develop the 
highest quality farmland, leaving lower quality land in agricultural pro-
duction.204 
 Secondly, enterprise zone programs’ links to sprawl should be 
addressed because the expansion of sprawl development increases 
automobile usage.205 Sprawl development leads to increased use of 
automobiles as people travel farther for work, errands, and recrea-
tion.206 Congestion caused by sprawl costs $72 billion per year nation-
ally in lost time and expended fuel.207 Increased automobile usage 
degrades air quality, increases air pollution, and contributes to global 
warming.208 While development advocates are correct in contending 
that technological improvements decrease overall vehicle emissions, 
air pollution is still a serious problem.209 In 1994, EPA concluded that 
the vast majority of major U.S. cities had unhealthy levels of air pollu-
tion because development sources contributed to a 100% increase in 
vehicle usage from 1970.210 In 1998, EPA estimated that the health 
effects of ozone pollution related to traffic cost between one to two 
billion dollars per year.211 Given the tremendous cost of air pollution, 
states should address the ways in which enterprise zone programs ex-
acerbate this problem.212 As tax incentive programs that reflect state 
investments, enterprise zones should incorporate policy choices that 
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minimize air pollution.213 Because enterprise zone programs are tax 
incentive programs, states can address the programs’ contribution to 
sprawl that causes air pollution without limitations on vehicle travel or 
new development.214 
 Likewise, state programs should not invest in unnecessarily in-
creasing impervious surface or threatening wildlife habitat by encour-
aging sprawl development.215 The environmental impact of increased 
impervious surface includes increased flooding, erosion, and pollut-
ant discharges into waterbodies.216 Additionally, sprawl development 
threatens wildlife through habitat loss, habitat fragmentation, and 
increased pollution in wildlife habitat.217 Enterprise zone programs’ 
contribution to these results can be minimized by addressing their 
links to sprawl development.218 
 The free-choice concerns of property rights advocates should not 
stop states from reforming enterprise zone programs to promote 
smart growth.219 These programs represent state policy choices about 
where to provide significant tax incentives to encourage develop-
ment.220 Since businesses may still locate in areas that lack enterprise 
zones, limiting zones to areas consistent with smart growth strategies 
should not implicate property rights advocates’ concerns about free-
choice that lead them to argue against limitations on development 
such as zoning or planning requirements.221 In addition, if develop-
ment advocates are correct that most Americans prefer to live in areas 
of sprawl development—a contention that many smart growth advo-
cates would counter—there would be little need to provide incentives 
to develop such areas.222 
 The goals of enterprise zone programs can likely be met just as 
effectively without promoting sprawl. To the extent that the programs’ 
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goals include community development and stimulating economic 
growth in blighted communities, it makes little sense to develop rapidly 
expanding communities instead of strengthening existing ones.223 
When the programs’ goals focus on improving the statewide economy 
by keeping businesses from moving to other states, aiding struggling 
firms, and luring out-of-state businesses, the rationale for providing in-
centives for businesses to relocate from an established community to an 
expanding community is weak.224 One could argue that moving a busi-
ness from an established community to an expanding one will help the 
business grow or encourage the business to remain in the state. How-
ever, encouraging relocation from within a state does not attract out-
side firms, and it seems just as likely that existing firms could either ex-
pand or be persuaded to remain in the state with an incentive package 
at their current location, or for relocation consistent with smart growth 
plans. 
 Addressing the environmental impact of state enterprise zone 
programs would bring the programs more in line with their original 
purpose.225 As originally envisioned, the programs were intended to 
revitalize blighted communities in urban areas.226 Though the con-
servative members of Parliament and the academics at the Heritage 
Foundation who championed the policy would not likely have called 
their goal “smart growth,” urban revitalization is a central tenet of 
smart growth.227 Consequently, states could achieve reform of the pro-
grams to promote smart growth by focusing on the programs’ original 
goal of urban revitalization.228 
 Even if an individual state’s program did not originate from ur-
ban revitalization goals, the nature of the programs makes them well-
suited to promote smart growth without forgoing many of their other 
goals.229 If enterprise zone programs targeted geographical areas in 
keeping with smart growth planning, the state programs could still 
keep businesses from moving to another state, aid struggling firms, 
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and lure out-of-state businesses.230 Smart growth planning can achieve 
its goals without reducing the effective incentives provided by enter-
prise zone programs.231 
 While the ideal program structure is likely to vary by state, Mary-
land provides a strong example of an enterprise zone program that 
promotes smart growth as opposed to sprawl development.232 The 
Maryland smart growth program directs state spending into established 
communities.233 The program creates PFAs as areas “targeted for future 
growth” and prohibits state spending on “growth-related projects” out-
side PFAs.234 By targeting economic development spending to existing 
communities in a manner consistent with statewide development goals, 
the program ensures that economic development incentives will pro-
mote smart growth.235 While Maryland’s program provides the most 
comprehensive example, other states have enacted reforms to address 
the programs’ links to sprawl, demonstrating the viability of such re-
forms.236 
B. An Economic Evaluation of State Enterprise Zone Programs 
 Attempts by environmental advocates to address the links between 
enterprise zone programs and sprawl development could be inter-
preted by potential zone communities as demanding a choice between 
jobs and environmental conservation, as enterprise zones are, in part, 
job creation programs.237 Environmental organizations and labor un-
ions have good reason to form strategic alliances to avoid the jobs-
versus-the-environment dynamic that pins environmental protection 
against community jobs.238 A person’s basic needs include both the 
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economic sustenance provided by jobs and the physical well-being pro-
vided by a healthy environment.239 Consequently, environmental advo-
cates who fail to take the economic needs of a community into account 
can appear either out of touch with those needs or indifferent to 
them.240 Conversely, those who champion jobs over environmental pro-
tection ignore the physical need workers have for a healthy environ-
ment and livable community.241 
 While efforts to amend state enterprise zone programs to limit 
their link to sprawl and refashion the programs as smart growth initia-
tives may appear to demand a choice between jobs and environmental 
protection, they likely do not.242 Although the majority of states do not 
evaluate the efficacy of their tax incentive programs—including enter-
prise zone programs—economic evaluations of the programs have 
shown mixed results at best.243 In terms of job creation, the economic 
studies have not found that state enterprise zones created significantly 
more jobs than would have existed without the zone.244 A 2000 study 
concluded that enterprise zones have little positive impact on “em-
ployment outcomes.”245 Similarly, an analysis of sixty-five zones in thir-
teen states by Peters and Fisher concluded that zones that “spatially tar-
geted” blighted communities created few additional jobs, and many 
employees of businesses within the zone lived outside of the enterprise 
zone, undermining the goal of job creation for the zone community.246 
In terms of the zones’ impact on economic growth, Peters and Fisher’s 
2002 review of the economic literature concluded that, while econo-
metric studies of enterprise zones were “controversial,” and the results 
were “not in agreement,” the majority of recent literature found that 
state enterprise zones had “little or no impact on growth.”247 While 
more economic literature exists finding evidence of enterprise zone 
programs’ impact on firm location decisions, the literature is still di-
vided.248 
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 Environmental advocates attempting to address the environmental 
impact of state enterprise zone programs should evaluate the programs 
on their own terms. As evaluated in the bulk of economic literature, 
these programs fail to meet their stated goals of stimulating business 
and investment in economically depressed areas, creating jobs, generat-
ing economic growth, and addressing the impact of economic disloca-
tions.249 Critiquing programs on their own terms avoids the jobs-versus-
the-environment dynamic—if the programs have not created signifi-
cantly more jobs than would have existed without them, then address-
ing environmental impact does not threaten job creation. Moreover, if 
the programs have little or no impact on economic growth, then eco-
nomic benefits of the programs cannot be used to justify their envi-
ronmental costs. If the benefits provided by enterprise zones fail to im-
pact firm location decisions—an area where the economic literature is 
in sharper conflict—then there is little justification for these programs 
at all.250 
 A critique of enterprise zone programs that addresses both their 
links to sprawl development and their economic failings invites a 
broader reform coalition than would a more limited environmental 
critique. Labor unions, community development advocates, and tax-
payer advocates all should have an interest in ensuring that job creation 
programs actually create jobs. Moreover, any constituency vying for 
state funding has an interest in limiting inefficient tax breaks to in-
crease available revenue.251 A focus on enterprise zone programs’ eco-
nomic accountability, therefore, could not only help environmental 
advocates avoid conflict over job creation, but also invite a broad-based 
coalition to advance reform. 
Conclusion 
 States began enacting enterprise zones in order to meet the eco-
nomic needs of struggling communities. Accordingly, most state en-
terprise zone programs’ zone designations are run by the state’s de-
partment of commerce or economic development and focus on local 
economic indicators. By targeting designated areas for economic de-
velopment incentives, however, the programs make implicit environ-
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mental policy decisions. In many states the programs fuel sprawl de-
velopment by encouraging business relocation into rapidly developing 
areas. Sprawl, in turn, contributes to the destruction of natural areas, 
the degradation of air and water quality, and the depletion of wildlife 
habitat. 
 An explicit evaluation of this environmental impact should be built 
into the zone designation process. Moreover, states should reform their 
programs to minimize these impacts. The environmental impact of en-
terprise zone programs, however, should not be evaluated in a vacuum. 
Enterprise zone programs are primarily economic development pro-
grams, and therefore community needs for job creation must be rec-
ognized. When enacted successfully, smart growth principles encourage 
states, regions, and local communities to promote both economic de-
velopment and environmental conservation. Consequently, reform of 
state enterprise zone programs in accordance with smart growth prin-
ciples can attempt to minimize the programs’ environmental impact 
and ensure the programs’ economic viability. States can therefore 
maximize the benefit of their expenditures by reforming their enter-
prise zone programs to ensure that the programs promote economi-
cally accountable smart growth. 
